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Consumer Protection
Protecting the Medical Patient's Right to Privacy
Victoria K. Lin

Code Sections Affected
Civil Code §§ 56.104 (new), 56.35 (amended).
AB 416 (Machado); 1999 STAT. Ch. 527
Civil Code § 56.31 (new); Labor Code § 3762 (amended).
AB 435 (Corbett); 1999 STAT. Ch. 766

I. INTRODUCTION
Article I, section 1 of the California Constitution expressly guarantees to
individuals a right to privacy.' Since the enactment of the privacy amendment, the
California Supreme Court has held that this provision protects people from the
improper use of information which has been properly obtained for a specific
purpose.2
However, "[p]rivacy concerns are not absolute; they must be balanced against
other important interests., 3 "[N]ot every act which has some impact on personal
privacy invokes the protections of the [state] Constitution."4 Accordingly, invasion
of a private interest is not a violation of the California constitution if the invasion
is justified, as may be the case for a legally authorized or socially beneficial activity
of the government or private entities. 5 Indeed, the relative importance of the interest
is determined
by its proximity to the functions of a particular public or private
6
enterprise.
Legislators have struck a balance between the medical privacy rights of citizens
and the rights of interested parties through the enactment of Chapter 766, 7 which

1. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 1; see id. (stating that "[a]ll people by nature are free and independent and have
inalienable rights. Among these are enjoying and defending life, liberty, acquiring, possessing, and protecting
property, and pursuing and obtaining safety, happiness, and privacy").
2.
See White v. Davis, 13 Cal. 3d 757, 775, 533 P.2d 222, 234, 120 Cal. Rptr. 94, 106 (1975)
(determining that one of the principal objectives of the privacy amendment is to recognize principal "mischiefs"
such as "government snooping" or misuse of properly obtained information).
3.
Hill v. Nat'I Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 7 Cal. 4th 1, 37, 865 P.2d 633, 655,26 Cal. Rptr. 2d 834,857

(1994).
4.
5.
6.

Wilkinson v. Tunes Mirror Corp., 215 Cal. App. 3d 1034, 1046,264 Cal. Rptr. 194,202 (1989).
Hill, 7 Cal. 4th at 38, 865 P.2d at 655, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 857.
Id., 865 P.2d at 655, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 857.

7. See CAL Crv. CODE § 56.31 (enacted by Chapter 766) (permitting the disclosure or use of medical
information regarding a patient's HIV-positive status only with "the prior authorization from the patient").
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regulates disclosure of medical information records subject to the Confidentiality
of Medical Information Act. Moreover, the newly passed Chapter 527 returns some
control of medical information to the individual by prohibiting providers of health
care, health care services, or health care contractors from releasing medical
information relating to a patient's outpatient psychotherapy treatment unless the
provider strictly adheres to specific requirements, such as providing a written
request explaining the length of time the information will be kept before being
destroyed. 8
Until the passage of Chapters 766 and 527, an individual's right to medical
privacy had been at odds with the interest of employers or the government in
gaining access to a person's information contained in medical records.9 This
Legislative Note traces the developments of privacy law in the field of workers'
compensation, documenting the need for changes in the Confidentiality of Medical
Information Act, and exploring Chapters 766 and 527 as they impact existing
medical privacy laws.
H1. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. Confidentialityof Medical InformationAct

California Civil Code section 56 and its companion parts codified the
Confidentiality of Medical Information Act (CMIA).' ° The purpose of the CMIA
is to protect the confidentiality of individually identifiable medical information
obtained by health care providers." Despite this purpose, the Act does establish
limited circumstances under which the release of such information to specified
2
entities or individuals is permissible.1
As defined by CMIA, medical information is any individually identifiable
information in possession of or derived from a health care provider or health care
service plan regarding a patient's medical history, mental or physical condition, or
treatment.' 3 CMIA requires a health care provider to hold confidential a patient's
medical information unless the information falls under one of several exceptions
8.

See CA. CIv. CODE § 56.104(a)(2) (enacted by Chapter 527) (providing the guidelines for requesting

information specifically relating to an individual's outpatient treatment with a psychotherapist); infra notes 50-54
and accompnying text (discussing this aspect of the new law).
9.
See James G. Hodge, Jr., The Intersection of Federal Health Information Privacy and State
Administrative Law: The Protectionof Individual HealthDataand Workers' Compensation,51 ADMIr4. L. REV.

117, 121 (1999) (stating that workers' compensation is in conflict with modem notions of health information
privacy because "[t]he privacy of health information cannot fully be preserved in a government-controllcd,
mandatory system" that adjudicates medical injuries).

10. CAL. CIV. CODE § 56 (West 1982).
11.

See id. § 56.10(a) (West Supp. 2000) (setting the guidelines for authorization of release of medical

information).
12.

Id

13.

Id. § 56.05(0 (West Supp. 2000).
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to the Act.' 4 For instance, a provider must release information pursuant to a court
order or a search warrant lawfully issued. 5

Nothing in CMIA prevents a health care provider from supplying, upon specific
request, "the patient's name, address, age, sex, general description of the reason for

treatment, general condition of the patient, and any information that is not medical
information as defined in CMIA.'

For the most part, no health care provider may

disclose medical information regarding a patient without first obtaining an
authorization.' 7 However, a health care provider is relieved from liability if it "can
show that the disclosure is excepted either by the mandatory 8 or permissive 9

provisions of the Act, which allow disclosure of medical information without prior
authorization under specified circumstances.

2°

These circumstances include

disclosure compelled "by a court pursuant to an order of that court" 2' or in an
emergency situation "for purposes of diagnosis or treatment of the patient."'

The narrowly defined requirements found in Civil Code section 56.10 reflect
the Legislature's interest in assuring that medical information is disclosed only for
a specific purpose, to an identified party, for a limited period of time.23 In

California, employers and insurance companies, for example, have a strong interest
in obtaining full access to the results of medical examinations for employees

seeking workers' compensation benefits. 24 At times, this interest conflicts with the
individual's highly-valued right to privacy25 Nonetheless, the existing mandatory
and permissive exceptions do recognize the need to strike a balance between a
legitimate interest for access to medical information and an individual's preference
for keeping that information confidential.2 6

14. See id. § 56. 10(b)(1)-(8), (c)(l)-(17) (WestSupp. 2000) (listing themandatoryandpermissive instances
when medical information may be disclosed without the patient's authorization).
15. CAL CIV. CODE § 56.10(b)(1), (6) (West Supp. 2000).
16. ASSEMBLY COMMITEE ON JUDICIARY, ANALYSIS OF AB 62, at 2 (Apr. 20, 1999).
17. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 56.10(a) (West Supp. 2000) (providing that medical information cannot be
disclosed without the patient's authorization except as otherwise provided).
18. See id. § 56.10(bI)()-(8) (West Supp. 2000) (providing guidelines for required disclosure of medical
information); supra note 15 and accompanying text (explaining mandatory disclosure provisions).
19. See id. § 56.10(c)(1)-(17)(West Supp. 2000) (explaining situations in which medical information may
be disclosed); see also supra note 15 and accompanying text (delineating the permissive disclosure provisions).
20. Pettus v. Cole, 49 Cal. App. 4th 402, 426, 57 Cal. Rptr. 2d 46, 62 (1996); see CAL. CIV. CODE §
56.10(b)-(c) (West Supp. 2000) (containing the provisions to which the Pettus court is referring in the quoted
passage).
21. CAL CIV. CODE § 56.10(b)(1) (West Supp. 2000).
22. Id. § 56.10(c)(1) (West Supp. 2000).
23. Pettus,49 Cal. App. 4th at 426, 57 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 62.
24. See David G. Scalise & Kevin P. Farmer, Disclosure of a Patient's Medical Information to Third
Parties: How Much Is Too Much?, 22 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 199, 199 (1998) (suggesting that employers are
responsible for paying for medical exams, which entitles employers to the doctor's diagnosis).
25. Hodge, Jr., supra note 9, at 121.
26. Pettus,49 Cal. App. 4th at 427,57 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 62.
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B. Confidentiality of Medical Information in Workers' Compensation Claims

From its inception, the workers' compensation program "sacrificed individual
control over the uses of health information concerning work-related injuries in the
interests of providing uniformity and consistency in mediating claims. 27 The
compensation process was intended to be government-controlled; thus, employees
hurt at work were required to report their injuries to their employers and
subsequently to government authorities.28 The workers' compensation model
explicitly rejected an individual's interest in insulating information about workrelated injuries from employers or the government.29
On occasion, this broad disclosure policy regarding medical information has
resulted in exposure of medical information that is not associated with the workrelated injury. For instance, AIDS Legal Services in San Jose, California, assisted
a client who was treated for back pain from an industrial injury.30 Although his
fIV-positive status had nothing to do with his injury, the patient disclosed his
medical condition solely to avoid medication interaction complications. 3 Doctors
put the unredacted HIV status information in the emergency room treatment records
and sent the unredacted HIV information "to the client's employer's workers'
compensation insurer.' 3 2 "The insurer included those emergency room records in
a report that [was] sent to a workers' compensation doctor to calculate a rating of
the client's permanent disability" in order to determine compensation.33 The insurer
also sent copies of the entire report, including the unredacted
HIV information, to
34
the client, his employer, and his private chiropractor.
Additionally, CMIA provides that a health care professional may disclose
medical information without a patient's authorization to the extent necessary to
determine responsibility for payment and to ensure that payment is made.35
Furthermore, information and records acquired, maintained, or disclosed pursuant
to a workers' compensation claim are not subject to the confidentiality requirement
of CMUI in a payment dispute. 36 Thus, in the situation regarding the HIV-positive
client,37 the patient's LYIV-positive condition could be disclosed to his employer as
well as to his employer's insurer without his consent because this information was

27.
28.
29.
30.

Hodge, Jr., supranote 9, at 124.
IAt
Id.
ASSEMBLY FLOOR, ANALYSIS OF AB 435, at 2 (May 19, 1999).

31.
32.

Id.
Id.

33. Id.
34. Id. at 2-3
35. CAL CIV. CODE § 56.10(c)(2) (West Supp. 2000).
36. Id.§ 56.30(f) (West Supp. 2000).
37. See supra notes 30-34 and accompanying text (explaining an incident in which a patient's HIV status
was disclosed when that HIV status had no relation to the individual's workers' compensation claim).
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communicated during an examination intended to be reported for purposes of a
workers' compensation claim.38 Therefore, according to these laws, employers and
employers' insurers may access any information communicated during a medical
check-up without first obtaining authorization from the patient, as long as the
information was exchanged during an exam relating to recovery under workers'
compensation insurance.
C. Mental Health Records
Another area in which an individual's privacy interests are implicated involves
the release of mental health records. Often, treatment "involves divulgence of
embarrassing, sometimes shameful information about a patient's thoughts, desires,
family members and associates, and past history.' 39 Under previous practices,
managed care companies did not acknowledge the sensitive nature of such
documents. 4 For example, a therapist could fax a complete patient file to another
party or permit a visitor to read an entire patient file while having the option to
photocopy material merely by making a request for a specific file.41 These parties
did not have to state a reason for such use of the patient's record. 42
The Lanterman-Petris-Short Act43 provides some protection against the release
of mental health records, but only for inpatient care and institutions that provide it,
not for outpatient assistance and private providers. 44 Consequently, prior to the
enactment of Chapters 766 and 527, California legislators had expressed concerns
that personal mental health information would not be kept confidential.4'
IH. CHAPTER 766
Chapter 766 limits disclosure of medical information to data related to an
employee's claim for workers' compensation by prohibiting the disclosure of a
person's HIV status when the patient has not made a prior authorization, unless the
injured worker claims to be infected with or exposed to HIV through an incident
arising out of his or her employment.46 Accordingly, if the patient reveals his or her

38. See supra notes 35-36 and accompanying text (providing circumstances in which organizations and
individuals are entitled to receive information disclosed during an examination).
39. ASSEMBLY COMMITrEE ON HEALTH, COMMrrrEEANALYSIS OF AB 416, at 3 (May 11, 1999).
40. l.
41.

1l

42. Id.
43. CAL WELF. & INST. CODE § 5000 (West 1998).
44.

See ASSEMBLY COMMrrrEE ON HEALTH, COMMImEE ANALYSIS OF AB 416, at 2 (May 11, 1999)

(implying that the Lanterman-Petris-Short Act is applied primarily to inpatient care and institutions).
45.

See ASSEMBLY COMMrITEE ON APPROPRIATIONS, COMMrFrEE ANALYSIS OF AB 416, at 1 (May 26,

1999) (outlining the concerns of legislators to this effect).
46. CAL CIV. CODE § 56.31 (enacted by Chapter 766).
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IV-positive status to a nurse in order to insure that examination materials will be
sterilized, and the person's HIV status does not pertain directly to the recovery the
patient is seeking under workers' compensation benefits, then the information
cannot be reported to the employer or the employer's insurer without the patient's
permission.
Moreover, the amended law specifies that medical information and records may
not be disclosed to an employer unless the diagnosis of the injury would affect the
employer's premium 47 or the information is necessary for the employer to have in
order to modify the employee's duties as a result of the injury.48 Nevertheless, by

its express language, Chapter 766 does not "prohibit a redaction decision by a
workers' compensation judge from being appealed to the Workers' Compensation
Appeals Board. 4 9

IV.CHAPTER 527
Chapter 527 restricts access to mental health medical information. "[N]o
provider of health care, health care service plan, or contractor may release medical
information" if the data specifically relates to an individual's "outpatient treatment
with a psychotherapist. ' 50 The information request should specifically identify the
information sought relating to a patient's outpatient treatment with a
psychotherapist and the specific intended use to which the information will be put,51
as well as the length of time the information will be kept before being disposed of
or destroyed.52 In addition, the request must be accompanied by two statements: one
which will state that "the information will not be used for anything other than its
intended use, 5 3 and another that will provide assurances that the information will
be destroyed. 54 The new law prohibits contractors from releasing mental health
records, and also prohibits such release by health care service plan providers.55 A
violation of California Civil Code section 56.104 could result in compensatory
damages, punitive damages, payment of attorney's fees, and payment of costs of
litigation if the patient sustains economic loss or personal injury as a result of the
exposure of the medical record.56

47. CAL. LAB. CODE § 3762(c)(1) (amended by Chapter 766).
48. Id. § 3762(c)(2) (amended by Chapter 766).
49.

1999 Cal. Legis. Serv. ch. 766, sec. 3, at 4445, 4446 (West),

50. CAL.CIV. CODE § 56.104(a) (enacted by Chapter 527).
51. lId § 56.104(a)(1) (enacted by Chapter 527).
52. lXZ§ 56.104(a)(2) (enacted by Chapter 527).
53.

Id. § 56.104(a)(3) (enacted by Chapter 527).

54. Id § 56.104(a)(4) (enacted by Chapter 527).
55.
56.

Id. § 56.104(a) (enacted by Chapter 527).
Id. § 56.35 (amended by Chapter 527).
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V. ANALYSIS OF THE NEW LAWS

A. Chapter766
Opponents of Chapter 766 urged that the new law would make an occupational
injury unnecessarily complicated by requiring the injured worker to consent to the
reporting of medical information to the employer.57Under prior law, employers
were allowed to order a broad discovery that "properly [afforded them] the
opportunity to determine for [themselves] whether the injuries, which plaintiffs
operations, actually arose from other
assert[ed] were caused by [on-the-job]
58
ILV.
as
such
medical conditions,"
In this respect, the new guidelines fail to provide adequate protections for
employers. Rather than allowing employers to find relevant information, Chapter
766 requires employers to evaluate medical facts that the plaintiff deems
significant. 59 Consequently, Chapter 766 permits an employee to hide important
medical history by claiming that the information may be related to his or her HIV
status.
Further difficulties arise when medical examinations lead to increased costs on
premiums for employers because, in such cases, insurers may disclose the patient's
diagnosis if the medical records are considered "documents that affect the
premium." 6 Consequently, the insurance company may have to disclose symptoms
related to the employee's HIV-positive status if IV status affects the employer's
premium. This contradicts the purpose of the enactment of Civil Code section
56.316' because the goal of Chapter 766 is to prohibit the disclosure of medical
information relative to a patient's HIV-positive status.62
In one respect, Chapter 766 may not be necessary because if a problem arises
with regard to broad discovery, a workers' compensation judge (WCJ) has the
63
"authority to hear discovery disputes and make orders respecting [them]." In
exercising discretion in this area, a WCJ tries "to achieve an appropriate balance
between the public policy favoring liberality of pre-trial discovery and the specific
policy applicable to workers' compensation cases [so] that [such situations] shall
57. SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE, COMM1TrEE ANALYSIS OF AB 435, at 4 (July 13, 1999).
58. Britt v. Superior Court, 20 Cal. 3d 844,862,574 P.2d 766,778, 143 Cal. Rptr. 695,707 (1978).
59. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 56.31 (enacted by Chapter 766) (allowing disclosure of a patient's HIV-positive
status if an employee authorizes such disclosure, or if the employee claims that the infection occurred due to

employment activities).
60.

CAL LAB. CODE § 3762(c)(1) (amended by Chapter 766); see also i. § 3762(a) (amended by Chapter

766) (stating that insurers shall discuss all elements that affect the employer's premium, and that copies of the
documents that affect the premium shall be supplied).

61. See CAL CIv. CODE § 56.31 (enacted by Chapter 766) (attempting to protect the medical records of
patients infected with HIV).
62. See SENATE RuLES CoMMm , COMMI=TEE ANALYsIs OF AB 435, at 2 (Sept. 5, 1999) (describing
the reasons behind Chapter 766's promulgation).
63. Allison v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd., 72 Cal. App. 4th 654,664,84 Cal. Rptr. 2d 915, 921 (1999).

239
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be adjudicated expeditiously, inexpensively and without encumbrance of any
character."" Resolution of the dispute by a WCJ may be more beneficial to parties
because the WCJ can determine a procedure that fulfills due process concerns while
ensuring timely completion of discovery proceedings. 6
However, to its credit, Chapter 766 protects patients from unwanted medical
information disclosures, situations where in a patient divulges his or her HIVpositive status to the healthcare practitioner merely to avoid medical
complications. 66
B. Chapter527
Speaking with healthcare practitioners is not always easy. Often, "matters
disclosed to the physician arise in most sensitive areas often difficult to reveal even
to the doctor." 67 This concern is heightened when the "doctor" involved is a

psychotherapist, as matters discussed during such sessions are highly personal.68
Chapter 527 therefore provides solutions to the mental healthcare patient wishing
to fully inform his or her psychotherapist, but fearing that the information might be
divulged to third parties.
By restricting employers to discovering information that is directly related to
the recovery the employee seeks under workers' compensation statutes,69 Chapter
527 avoids divulgence of unrelated medical histories. Chapter 527 staves off the
possibility that medical administrators might inadvertently give medical records or
information to a health care service plan billing agent by forcing the administrators
to delve deeper into the request.70 Essentially, the health care provider will do this
by examining the statements concerning the purpose of the request, the length of
time during which the file will be used, and the assurance that the information will
be used only for its permissible purpose and will be destroyed soon thereafter.1
This is a positive change, as the sensitivity surrounding mental health information
requires that steps be taken to ensure the patient's privacy to the extent possible in
the workers' compensation setting, where divulgences of some sort must occur so
that healthcare plans may evaluate the patient's claim.72

64.

Id., 84 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 921.

65. ld., 84 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 921.
66. See supra notes 30-34 and accompanying text (highlighting the necessity for Chapter 766).
67.

Palay v. Superior Court, 18 Cal. App. 4th 919, 932, 22 Cal. Rptr. 2d 839, 847 (1993).

68. See supra note 39 and accompanying text (acknowledging that the information divulged in mental
healthcare sessions often is embarrassing).

69. See supranote 59 (explaining the provisions of California Civil Code section 56.31).
70. See supra notes 50-55 and accompanying text (opining that Chapter 527 will reduce the chances of
unnecessary medical record releases).

71. Supra text accompanying notes 50-54 (explaining the provisions of Chapter 527).
72.

See supranote 35 and accompanying text (listing the purposes for which healthcare administrators may

divulge information in the workers' compensation setting).
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VI. CONCLUSION

Theoretically, allowing workers to control the disclosure of health information
is inconsistent with the goals of workers' compensation from the perspective of
employers who need to be able to gauge the extent of their liability in the workers'
compensation context. However, given the previous opportunities for disclosure
of needless and serious medical information on releases, California legislators have
enacted Chapters 527 and 766 in an effort to achieve a balance between employees'
privacy interests and employers' economic interests.73 By enacting these provisions,
legislators have developed a strict system to protect the mental and physical health
of employees, and to maintain the confidentiality of private health information.

73. See, e.g., supranotes 30-34 and accompanying text (documenting the egregious, if accidental, release
of one patient's HIV status information in the workers' compensation setting).
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Is It Necessary?: Increase in Stogie Smoking Triggers "New

and Improved" Warning Labels
Jason M. Miller
Code SectionsAffected
Health and Safety Code §§ 104550, 104551, 104552 (new).
AB 1595 (Migden); 1999 STAT. Ch. 693
I. INTRODUCTION

Smoking cigars has become prevalent among society's youth.' The Center for
Disease Control and Prevention conducted a study in 1996 that indicated that onequarter of the nation's teenagers had smoked at least one cigar over the course of
the preceding year.2 In part, the cigar-smoking trend among athletes and movie
stars, and of course the traditional stogie-lighting at celebrated events, has
perpetuated cigar sales nationwide; sales increased fifty percent between 1993 and
1998. 3 The significant increase in cigar smoking has re-ignited public concern over
its adverse effects, and recent studies indicate that this concern is well-founded.4 A
1999 Kaiser Permanente study of 18,000 men suggests that those who smoke cigars
are "twice as likely as nonsmokers to develop cancers of the throat, mouth,
esophagus, and lung, and
are at significantly greater risk [of] chronic lung disease
5
disease."
and coronary
Chapter 693 requires that new warning labels be placed on all cigars distributed
within California.6 The labels must prominently disclose the potential health risks

related to cigar smoking. In addition, the new labels must warn consumers that
cigars contain many of the same carcinogens present in cigarettes.8 According to
the new Raw's author, one of the primary purposes of Chapter 693 is to "dispel the

1.

ASSEMBLY COMMIITEE ON GovERN?,IENTAL ORGANIZATION, COMMITrEE ANALYSIS OF AB 1595, at

3 (Apr. 19, 1999).
2.
Ld.
3.
Philip Connors, CigarSmokers Face IncreasedRisks of Cancer,Study Shows, WALL ST. J., June 10,
1999, at B2.
4.
ASSEMBLYCOMMITTEEONAPPROPRIATIONS, COMMTrEEANALYSIS OFAB 1595, at 1 (May 19,1999).
5.
Keay Davidson, Stogie Smoking Found to Double Risk of Cancer: Migden Cites Kaiser Study in
Callingfor Cigar Warning Labels, S.F. EXAMINER, June 9, 1999, at Al.
6.
CAL HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 104550(a) (enacted by Chapter 693).

7.
8.

Id.
Id.
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myth that cigar smoking is a safe alternative to smoking cigarettes." 9 Challengers,
however, in vigorous opposition to the legislation, contend that the new warning
labels are unnecessary because current warning labels adequately warn the public
of the health concerns related to cigar smoking. 0 In an effort to air both sides of the
debate, this Legislative Note traces tobacco legislation at the federal and state
level,' and provides an overview of the positions taken by both the challengers and
the advocates of Chapter 693.2
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND

A. FederalRegulation of Tobacco Products
The realization that cigarette smoking poses significant health risks prompted
the United States Congress1 3 to enact the Federal Cigarette Labeling and
Advertising Act of 1965.'4 This Act mandates placement of the familiar "Surgeon
General's Warning" on every package of cigarettes and on every advertisement
promoting cigarette usage.15 The warnings advise the consumer that smoking
causes cancer, complicates pregnancies, and poses other serious health
cigarettes
6
risks.'
In addition, federal law requires that manufacturers of smokeless tobacco place
a warning label on the product that warns consumers of the health risks involved
with the usage of that product. 17 The warning must include one of three messages
that indicates smokeless tobacco may cause mouth cancer, gum disease, and tooth
loss, and that smokeless tobacco is not a safe alternative to cigarette smoking."
Despite federal law that requires warning labels to be placed on cigarettes and
smokeless tobacco, the federal government has yet to implement a similar
requirement for cigars. 9

ASSEMBLYCOMMTrEEONAPPROPRIATIONSCOMM1TrEEANALYSISOFAB 1595, at 1 (May 19,1999).
9.
10. Infra note 59 and accompanying text.

11. Infra Part].
12. Infra PartIV.
13.

Francisco Hernandez, Jr. & Jordan M. Parker, FederalPreemption of State Tort Actions Under the

FederalCigaretteLabelingandAdvertising Act, 27 ToRT & INS. LJ. 1, 1 (1991).
14.

Pub. L. No. 89-92,79 Stat. 445 (codified at 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1331-1341 (1965)).

15. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1333 (West 1989).
16. Id.
17. id. § 4402 (West 1998).
18.

Id.

19. ASSEMBLYCOMMrrrEEoNAPPROPRIATIONS, COMMrnrSANALYSISOFAB 1595, at2 (May 19, 1999).
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B. State Regulation of Cigars
1. Massachusetts

While a number of states have considered adopting regulations that would
require warning labels on cigars, aside from California, Massachusetts is the only
state to take action.20 Effective February 2000, manufacturers will commit a civil
violation when they distribute in Massachusetts cigar packages that do not bear one
of two labels: (1) "Warning: Cigar Smoke Contains Carbon Monoxide And
Nicotine, An Addictive Drug"; or (2) "Warning: Cigars Are Not A Safe Alternative
To Cigarettes Or Smokeless Tobacco Products." 2' In addition, retailers who sell
individual cigars will be required to display on the cigar containers one of the two
warning labels to ensure that the consumer is readily informed of the message.22
Tobacco companies responded to Massachusetts' successful effort to implement
warning labels on cigars by filing a complaint in federal court alleging that the
regulations violate the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution. 23 They
argue that the Massachusetts' cigar labeling requirements pose an undue burden on
interstate commerce.24 Tobacco companies contend that the likelihood of similar
labeling requirements being enacted in other states will soon require cigar packages
to carry numerous different labels and make compliance with the individual state
mandates onerous for manufacturers. 25 In support of this contention, cigar
manufacturers have alluded to the fact that manufacturers currently distribute
throughout several states cigars bearing labels that conform with the labeling
requirements imposed by California's Proposition 65-simply because of the
inherent difficulty of tracking cigars that are to be distributed for solely one state.26
2. California

In 1986, California voters passed the Safe Drinking Water and Toxic
Enforcement Act (Proposition 65).27 Pursuant to this Act, businesses must
adequately warn consumers before exposing them to chemicals that cause cancer

20. Interview with Kyra Emanuels, Associate Consultant, Office ofAssemblymemberMigden, Sacramento,
Cal. (Sept. 30, 1999) [hereinafter Emanuels Interview] (notes on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
21. MASS. REGS. CODE tit. 940, § 22.04(1) (1999).
22. Id. § 22.06(2)(e) (1999).
23. Complaint, at 56, Consolidated Cigar Corp. v. Reilly, No. 99CV1127OWGY (copy on file with the
McGeorge Law Review).
24. I.
25. Id.,
at [35.
26. Id., at 28.

27.

Restrictions on Toxic Discharges into Drinking Water, Requirement of Notice of Persons' Exposure

to Toxics, Initiative Statute, Prop. 65, §§ 1-8 (codified at CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 25249.5-25259).
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or reproductive toxicity. 28 On April 1, 1988, tobacco smoke and chewing tobacco
were classified as known carcinogens.2 9 Tobacco smoke was also listed as a
chemical known to cause reproductive toxicity.3" As a result, in August of 1988,
environmental interest groups filed a complaint that alleged that manufacturers of
cigars and other tobacco products were in violation of the labeling requirements
imposed by the Safe Drinking Water and Toxic Enforcement Act. 3t Negotiations
ensued, and the parties stipulated to a settlement agreement that required
manufacturers of cigars to place warning labels on retail packages.3 2 Display boxes
that contain individual cigars must exhibit a warning label that can readily be
observed by customers who remove the cigars. 3 The notice reads as follows:
"Warning: This Product Contains/Produces Chemicals Known To The State Of
California To Cause Cancer, And Birth Defects Or Other Reproductive Harm. '34
The settlement agreement, however, stated that federal, state, or local government
warning label requirements enacted subsequent to the agreement could replace the
agreed upon warning label, so long as the language comports with the Safe
Drinking Water and Toxic Enforcement Act. 35
III. CHAPTER 693
Chapter 693 provides that, by 2000 September 1, retail cigar packages shipped
for distribution in California must display one of three warning labels disclosing the
pertinent health concerns related to cigar smoking, in addition to a new message
indicating that cigars are not a healthy substitute for smoking cigarettes.3 6 Subject
only to printing abilities, each manufacturer is required to rotate its distribution of

28.
29.

CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25249.6 (West 1999).
SENATE HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES COMMITEE, COMMrITEE ANALYSIS OF AB 1595, at I (June

30, 1999).
30. Id. at 2.
31. California ex rel. John Van DeKamp v. Safeway Stores, Inc., No. 996780 (San Francisco Superior
Court 1988).
32. Stipulated Agreement at 5, California ex rel. John Van Dekamp v. Safeway Stores, Inc., No. 897576
(San Francisco Superior Court 1988).
33. Id. at 6.
at 5.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 5-6.
36.

CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 104550(a) (enacted by Chapter 693); see id. (setting forth three

options for cigar manufacturers:
[1] Warning: Cigars contain many of the same carcinogens found in cigarettes, and cigars are not
a safe substitute for smoking cigarettes. This product contains chemicals known to the State of
California to cause cancer and birth defects and other reproductive harm.
[2] Warning: Smoking cigars regularly poses risks of cancer of the mouth, throat, larynx, and
esophagus similar to smoking cigarettes. This product contains chemicals known to the State of
California to cause cancer and birth defects and other reproductive harm.
[3] Warning: Smoking cigars causes lung cancer, heart disease, and emphysema, and may complicate
pregnancy. This product contains chemicals known to the State of California to cause cancer and
birth defects and other reproductive harm.).
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retail packages of cigars so that a proportionate number of each label is displayed
within a twelve-month period.37 The labels must be placed in a reasonable manner

so that the language is clear and readable, taking into consideration other printed
material that may accompany the warning." Display boxes used to sell individual
cigars must
contain a warning label that is apparent to a consumer who removes the
39
cigars.
As has been noted, prior to the enactment of Chapter 693, manufacturers were
required to place warning labels on cigars as a result of a settlement agreement
between environmental interest groups and tobacco manufacturers. 4' The specific
language of that warning label, however, is to be replaced and effectively
superseded by the language of the warning label requirements promulgated by
Chapter 693.'
Each manufacturer or importer of cigars who distributes within California and
fails to place the Chapter 693 warning labels on the cigars will be subject to a civil
penalty of up to $2,500 per day for each violation.42 A number of local and State
officials are permitted to prosecute allegations that manufacturers are in violation
of Chapter 693 4 3 Any federal law enacted subsequent to Chapter 693 that requires
cigar manufacturers to provide warning labels on
cigars will supersede the
44
conflict.
a
of
event
the
in
693
Chapter
of
provisions
By its express language, the implementation of Chapter 693 does not affect a
number of lawsuits pending against cigar manufacturers.4' These lawsuits were filed
in an effort to compel cigar manufacturers to put warning labels on cigars to
disclose prominently the dangers of exposure to environmental tobacco smoke,
commonly known as second-hand smoke.4 6 The Legislature was concerned that,
absent express language that Chapter 693 does not affect the pending litigation,

37. Id. § 104550(b) (enacted by Chapter 693).
38.

Id. § 104550(d) (enacted by Chapter 693).

39. Id.
40. Supra notes 31-35 and accompanying text.
41. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 104550(f) (enacted by Chapter 693).
42. Id. § 104550(g) (enacted by Chapter 693).
43. Id. § 104550(h) (enacted by Chapter 693); see id. (providing that:
[aictions pursuant to this section may be brought by the Attorney General in the nam of the people
of the State of California, by any district attorney, by any city attorney of a city having a population
in excess of 750,000 people and with the consent of the district attorney, by a city prosecutor in any
city or city and county having a full-time city prosecutor).
44. Id. § 104552 (enacted by Chapter 693).
45. Id. § 104550(0 (enacted by Chapter 693); see id. (providing specifically that the enactment of Chapter
693 will not affect the litigation in: People v. General Cigar Co., San Francisco Superior Court No. 996780;
People v. PhillipMorris, Inc., Los Angeles Superior Court No. BC194217; and People v. Tobacco Exporters
International(USA), td., San Francisco Superior Court No. 301631).
46. Id.; Emanuels Interview, supra note 20; see Letter from Mark N. Todzo, Lexington Law Group, to
Assemblymember Carole Migden (June 28, 1999) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (suggesting that
Chapter 693 should include a warning for environmental tobacco smoke, and explaining that lawsuits have been
filed to require cigar manufacturers to warn non-smokers of the adverse effects of environmental tobacco smoke).
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cigar manufacturers would argue that Chapter 693 effectively exempted them from
those warning labels.47 However, the Legislature has made clear that only health
risks related to smoking cigars were contemplated as being within the ambit of
Chapter 693's provisions, and that consideration of whether a warning label for
environmental tobacco smoke is appropriate is outside the scope of the new law.4"
Thus, Chapter 693 does not exempt cigar manufacturers from such a requirement
simply by passing legislation in which the requirement was not included.4 9
Accordingly, for purposes of the current litigation, that Chapter 693 does not
include a warning label for environmental tobacco smoke is inconsequential."
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE NEW LAW

A. The Assertions of Chapter693's Advocates
Proponents ofChapter 693, such as the American Cancer Society, the American
Heart Association, and the American Lung Association, argue that the exclusion of
warning labels on cigars at the federal level portrays a view that cigar smoking does
not pose inherent health risks.5 ' This is a principle concern because a considerable
amount of toxins found in cigarettes, which cause cancer and other health-related
problems such as birth defects, are also found in cigars. 2 Proponents contend that
daily cigar smokers are twice as likely to get lung cancer, seven times more likely
to get oral cancer, and ten times more likely to get larynx cancer than are nonsmokers.53
Despite the endorsement of a federal requirement for cigar warnings by the
Federal Trade Commission, 54 some California lawmakers dismissed that progress
as a reason to delay immediate action, claiming that federal legislation requiring

47.
48.

Emanuels Interview, supra note 20.
Id.

49. Id.
50. Id.
51. ASSEMBLY COMMI-rEE ON GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATION, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF AB 1595, at
3 (Apr. 19, 1999).
52. Id; see Regina McEnery, CigarSmokersEngagingin DeadlyHobby, CancerInstituteSays, SALTLAKE
TRIB., May 21, 1998, at C2 (stating that the National Cancer Institute recently released a study that found that
cigar smoke "contains most of the same toxins found in second-hand cigarette smoke-ammonia, carbon
monoxide and nitrosamines-and in higher quantities").
53.

SENATEHEALTH & HuMAN SERVICES COMMrrTE COMMrrr

ANALYSIS OFAB 1595, at 3 (June 30,

1999).
54. FEDERAL TRADE COMM., CIGAR SALES AND ADVERTISING AND PROMOTIONAL EXPENDrrURES FOR
CALENDAR YEARS 1996 AND 1997, 17 (1999); see Caroline E. Mayer & John Schwartz, Trade Commission

Proposes Health Warningsfor Cigars;Labels Would Be Like Those on Cigarettes,WASH. POST, July 22, 1999,
at AI (reporting that the Federal Trade Commission was "[a]larmed by a dramatic increase in cigar consumption,
particularly among adolescents .... [and therefore] proposed placing the same advertising and labeling restrictions
on cigars that are now on cigarettes and chewing tobacco").
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warning labels on cigars is at least four, if not five, years away.5" In addition, the
State mandated Proposition 65 warning label for cigars are not specific to the health
concerns related to cigar smoking.56 The Proposition 65 warning label fails to
adequately address the health risks associated with cigar smoking, and only makes
a vague reference to the fact that cigars may cause cancer. 57 Supporters contend that

Chapter 693 is a commendable and significant change if it deters from smoking
cigars even one uninformed teenager who is unaware that "lighting up a stogie" is
not a healthy alternative to smoking cigarettes.58
B. The Assertions of Chapter693's Challengers
Opponents of Chapter 693, which include the Cigar Association of America and
the California Distributors Association, argue that Chapter 693 was unnecessary
because the Proposition 65 warning sufficiently warned cigar smokers of the
adversehealth effects associated with smoking cigars. 59The Proposition 65 warning
label specifically states: "This product contains/produces chemicals known to the
State of California to cause cancer, and birth defects or other reproductive harm.' 'W
In comparison, one of the Chapter 693 warning labels contains the precise
Proposition 65 warning label language, only adding a clause specifying lung cancer,
heart disease, and emphysema as potential health problems associated with cigar
smoking.61 Thus, opponents assert that the Proposition 65 warning label was
adequate, 62 and that the "new and improved" Chapter 693 label will be a failed
attempt to deter people from smoking cigars.63 To further support this contention,
challengers claim that there is no evidence that corroborates the supporters' position
that a false perception that cigars are a risk-free alternative to cigarettes is a
motivating factor for those who smoke cigars.6
In addition, action by the Federal Trade Commission proposing federal warning
labels on cigars strengthens the argument that the implementation of Chapter 693

55. See CAROLEM.IGDEN, AB 1595 Q&A(1999) [hereinafterMiODEN,AB 1595 Q&A] (copy on file with
the McGeorgeLaw Review) (explaining that the Federal Trade Commission cannot implement legislation without
the consent of Congress; thus, the hope of new regulation is, in realistic terms, four to five years away).
56. Id. at 1; see supra note 34 and accompanying text (explaining that the warning label required prior to
Chapter 693 only informs the user that the product contains cancer-causing agents, without reference to cigar
smoking in particular).
57. Supra note 34 and accompanying text.
58. Editorial, A CloserLook at Stogies, L.A. TIMEs, Aug. 8, 1999, at M44.
59.

SENATE HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES COMMITTEE, COMMrIIEE ANALYSIS OF AB 1595, at 4 (June

30, 1999).
60. Supra note 34 and accompanying text
61. Supra note 36.
62. SENATE HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES CoMMNrrE. COMMITTrEE ANALYSIS OF AB 1595, at 4 (June

30, 1999).
63. McEnery, supranote 52, at C2.
64. Complaint, supranote 23, at 36.
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was unnecessary.65 Challengers of Chapter 693 maintain that one uniform warning
label imposed at the federal level is a reasonable solution when compared with the

unworkable possibility of fifty different state warning labels.66
C. DormantCommerce Clause Challengesto Chapter693
Initiating warning label requirements for cigars at the state level will inevitably

lead to a variety of warning labels in the several states-which will undoubtedly be
a burden to cigar manufacturers. 67 As a result, Chapter 693 may face a challenge

similar to the argument framed against the Massachusetts regulations? that the
California law violates the dormant Commerce Clause. 69

In an area unregulated by the federal government, the states are free to act
provided they do so within the restraints of the Commerce Clause.70 Thus, although

the mandates of Chapter 693 apply to California cigar distributors, one might argue
that requiring out-of-state cigar manufacturers to place warning labels on cigars
overburdens interstate commerce!' However, as in the instant case, when

implementing an evenhanded law in an effort to promote the safety and general
welfare of its people, a state may place incidental burdens upon interstate

commerce provided that those burdens are not clearly excessive.72
Cigar manufacturers have argued that they will "face regulatory chaos" if they
are forced to comply with individual state warning labels, and that because of the

difficulty ofestablishing a state-specific distribution scheme, the only economically
viable alternative is to place the warning labels on all the cigars to be sold

65. See supra note 54 and accompanying text (describing Federal Trade Commission proposals in this
regard).
66. Letter from Carpenter, Snodgrass & Associates to Assemblymember Carole Migden (June 30, 1999)
(on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
67. Complaint, supranote 23, at 35.
68. See supra notes 23-26 and accompanying text (describing the Massachusetts situation).
69. Complaint, supranote 23, at 56.
70. City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 623 (1978); see U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8 (permitting
Congress "to regulate Commerce... among the several States").
71. See, e.g., Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Commnn, 432 U.S. 333,350-54 (1977) (holding
that North Carolina's facially neutral statute that required all apples entering the State to display only United
States grades violated the dormant Commerce Clause). Although the statute applied to North Carolina apples, the
court held that, in its application, the legislation was discriminatory against Washington apples, which endured
a more comprehensive inspection process than would have occurred under the United States apple grading system.
Id. at 354.
72. See Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970) (stating that:
"Where the statute regulates evenhandedly to effectuate a legitimate local public interest, and its
effects on interstate commerce are only incidental, it will be upheld unless the burden imposed on such
commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits... If a legitimate local purpose
is found, then the question becomes one of degree. And the extent of the burden that will be tolerated
will of course depend on the nature of the local interest involved, and on whether it could be promoted
as well with a lesser impact on interstate activities.")
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throughout the United States. 3 On the other hand, distributing cigars in this fashion
does not appear to be a threatening economic burden, as expenditures that would
have to be made to accommodate jurisdictional distribution schemes will not be
incurred. 74 More persuasive is the fact that for over a decade prior to the enactment
of Chapter 693, cigar manufacturers have distributed "the overwhelming majority"
of their cigars in the United States with the Proposition 65 warning labels affixed
to them, thereby demonstrating that individual state mandates are not economically
impractical and are less of an economic concern than cigar manufacturers suggest.75
Accordingly, the labeling requirements imposed by Chapter 693 are not likely to
be viewed as excessive burdens when weighed against the advancement of
uncontested legitimate local concerns such as the desire to warn people of the lifethreatening health risks associated with smoking cigars. 76 Thus, Chapter 693 will
likely withstand a constitutional attack under the Commerce Clause.
V. CONCLUSION

Irrespective of one's political ideology regarding whether governmental
imposition of warning label requirements is good policy, one cannot overlook that
Chapter 693 is an effort to forward a respectable objective. 77 Recent trends indicate
that smodng cigars has become more common among teenagers, and has increased
in the society as a whole.78 Thus, the promulgation of this legislation is timely,
especially considering the absence offederal regulation. 79 Nevertheless, challengers
of Chapter 693 have voiced legitimate concerns that the new warning labels are
unnecessary because the Proposition 65 warning label requirement, which was
superseded by the adoption of Chapter 693, sufficiently warned consumers of the
health risks associated with cigar smoking.80
Arguably, the most appropriate compromise and ultimate solution is for the
federal government to respond to the Federal Trade Commission's request for a
federal warning label, to be placed on all cigars, that sufficiently identifies the
health risks related to cigar smoking.8' Until such federal requirements are enacted,
73. E.g., Complaint, supranote 23, at T1 31-32.
74. See id., at 28 (explaining that cigar manufacturers distribute most of their cigars throughout the
United States with labels attached; therefore, only incidental costs will be added under the new scheme).
75. Id.
76. See Pike, 397 U.S. at 142 (explaining that unless the burdens placed on interstate commerce are

substantial, legislation that promotes legitimate local interests will survive Constitutional scrutiny).
77. See supra note 9 and accompanying text (explaining that the purpose of Chapter 693 is to educate cigar
smokers about the fact that stogie smoking is a health danger and not a safe substitute for cigarettes).
78. ASSEMBLY COMMITrEE ON GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATION, COMMIrEE ANALYSIS OF An 1595, at
3 (Apr. 19, 1999).
79. Supra note 51 and accompanying text.
80. Supra note 59 and accompanying text.

81. See supra text accompanying notes 65-66 (recapitulating the position of cigar manufacturers that
Chapter 693 is unnecessary in view of the proposed federal warning label).
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for better or worse, cigar manufacturers must be cognizant that California will
continue to demand cigar warning labels that promote a clear and uncompromised
message that cigar smoking has significant health repercussions.82

82. See supra text accompanying notes 56-57 (noting that the Proposition 65 warning label was not specific
to cigars and did not adequately warn smokers of the inherent health concerns related to smoking cigars).

